The article deals vvith the teaching of International Relations (IR) in Turkey from the perspective of international legal human rights developments and foreign policy. The relationship betvveen IR and human rights dates back to the beginning of the Second World War. Since then, the principle of respect for human rights has become one of the fundamental principles of IR. No state currently challenges the idea that human rights must be respected everyvvhere in the vvorld. It is generally accepted that human rights is not a domestic issue of states; but also important for and integrated with foreign policies. International legal human rights developments should thus be reflected in foreign policy vvith a human rights objective in teaching of IR. Despite the importance of the reflection in foreign policy of international legal human rights developments in teaching of IR, the results of an internet survey among the IR students in Turkey shovv a need to have more opportunity to be able to follovv the international developments in the area of international law of human rights.
Introduction
The principle of respect for human rights is today one of the fundamental principles of IR. It is typical of a nevv stage of development in the international society that can largely be traced back to the Second World War. The general principle, prohibiting gross and large-scale violations of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, has gradually emerged. During the Cold War, human rights vvere competing vvith the traditional principles such as the respect for the sovereignty, the equality of states and the non-interference in the domestic affairs. Hovvever, especially after the adoption of the global and regional legal systems and instruments, no state currently challenges the idea that human rights fnust be respected everyvvhere in the vvorld. The imposition of this principle on states is clear: he duty to refrain from gross violations of the rights rather than simply abiding to by specifıc regulations on human rights. Such rights cover the right not to be subjected to torture, the right to a fair trial, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest, ete.
This article is concerned vvith the importance of legal human rights developments (Sub-section 2) for a foreign policy vvith a human rights objective in teaching of IR in Turkey. Though there exist inescapable tension betvveen human rights and foreign policy (Subsection 3), it is also generally accepted that the issue of human rights is integrated vvith foreign policies of states (Sub-section 2) despite their constraints on human rights in general (Sub-section 4 and 5). Nonetheless, foreign policy vvith a human rights objective has various aims (Sub-section 6). In this article, before giving the theoretical explanations concerning the related concepts mentioned above, 1 the recent legal human rights developments and the results of an internet survey, 2 course on human rights ın the undergraduate curriculum of the departments of IR in Turkish universities?
The Recent Developments on International Human Rights Lavv and The Internet Survey

Recent Legal Developments
It is clear that the issue of intemational legal developments is very important for the principle of protection of human rights in IR. Such developments should therefore be reflected upon. For instance, there exist the recent decisions (10 October 2000) of the European Court of Human Rights conceming Akkoç and Satık cases. 3 In Akkoç case, the Court held that Turkey was to pay 89,000 sterling (UK) for the violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) on account of the failure of authoritıes to take preventive operational measures to protect individuals vvhose life are at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.
In Satık case, it vvas held that Turkey vvas to pay 55,000 sterling (UK) for the violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the ECHR in the absence of a plausible explanation vvhere individuals are injured during poliçe custody and the detainment in a prison. Also, it considered as a reason that there should exist some form of independent monitoring of the action of the security forces to ensure accountability for the force used. Such considerations suggest the importance of NGOs and the independent monitoring systems.
These legal approaches should be articulated more in IR by decision-makers, diplomats, the other related bureaucrats in the foreign policy decision makiııg process, and the other actors of IR, despite their reluctance about human rights. 
The Internet survey
The survey vvas conducted to fınd out to vvhat extent vvere international legal human rights developments as such follovved by undergraduate students in the departments of IR in Turkish universities?
The results of the Internet survey, vvhich vvas carried out on 14-15 May 2001, shovv us that of 40 the Turkish universities having the Faculties of Economics and Administrative or Political Sciences, 26 have the departments of IR. Of 26 departments of IR, 12 have an independent course on human rights in their undergraduate programmes. These figures mean that in the teaching of IR in Turkey, the degree of having an opportunity for the undergraduate students of IR to follovv international developments on human rights lavv is not satisfactory. Though the survey vvas carried out among the universities that vvere accessible through the above-mentioned source (see note 2) it can reasonably be assumed that the results vvould have not changed much if ali the Turkish universities had been accessible.
The Relationship Betvveen Foreign Policy and Human Rights
There is inescapable tension betvveen human rights and foreign policies of states. Whereas the reference to human rights includes an implication of a global society, foreign policy is concemed vvith the vvorld of states. In other vvorlds, governments act for their states, not for humanity. Can a solution to such tension be found simply by dropping the issue of human rights on the basis of the irrelevance to foreign policy? This option is no longer available. Today, agents of governments and foreign ministers are forced by international lavv to pay attention to vvhat is happening on human rights internationally. Further, respect for human rights vvas adopted by the OSCE, including conformity vvith the UN Covenants, as vvell as the UDHR.
It is also a moral imperative to make the promotıon of human rights a majör goal of foreign policies of states. 4 Those vvho accept national interest as the only majör goal of foreign policy, might be convinced in the way that moral consideration can only be eliminated as extra muros when IR are "a hell of inexpiable hatreds" and lıfe-anddeath situations. Additionally, it is a political imperative to make the promotion of human rights a majör goal of foreign policies. We live in a vvorld in which many issues such as trade, communications, and nuclear proliferation concern transnational flovvs that no single government can control. Similarly, in the realm of human rights, although they seem to consist mainly of national struggles between individuals (or groups) and their governments, the massive violations that occur today are lıkely to provoke flows of refugees seeking asylum abroad, affecting other nations. Moreover, national attempts to regulate the flow of migrant vvorkers are also likely to result in violation of human rights.
It is clear that early human rights laws served state's own political or economic purposes. This was in parallel with other international law issues, as international law in general is made in to serve common or reciprocal national interests. However, today's international law of human rights no longer serves any patent, particular interest; it is not reciprocal betvveen states; and there is no other state that is the victim or is othenvise offended when a state violates its human rights undertakings.
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This also raises the question of universality of human rights. Although there is the assertıon that universal rights exist, what these rights are is unclear. Universalism is an elusive and contested concept. Although there is a lack of agreement över the essential meaning of human rights today, they play a vital part ın IR, and the discussıon about the defınition of human rights reminds us of the primacy of human rights. Some experts claim that civil and political rights are [VOL. basic and indisputable; 6 they require some kind of abstinence or forbearance on the part of government. Hovvever, they are not selfgenerating; they need legislation, promotion, and protection. Some others claim that economic and social rights are basic; they, by contrast, cali for governments to provide resources of various kinds. Hovvever, the issue of the primacy of the rights has become unimportant tovvards the end of the 20 th century especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to CANİM model suggested by the author, it is in fact unnecessary to give priority to civil and political rights över the social and economic rights, and vice versa. The idea of universal human rights meets the need for human beings to establish a moral basis for polities. In the vvorld of relations betvveen states, the concern must be relational, particular and immediate. Although intemational society, operating under the guidance of the UN, agrees on an intemational rights regime, it does not relate very readily vvith vvhat is happening at the grassroots in the regions and among non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Third World states in general also challenge the claim to Universalism as the last step of a cultural imperialism that tries to impose inappropriate vvestern forms of thinking on the rest of human kind.
It can be argued that human rights is basically a moral phenomenan. The diffıculty here is to go on from this position to a general notıon of universal human rights. This can be proved by the 6 See J. Donnelly, International Human Rights, Boulder/San Fransisco/Oxford, VVestvievv Press, 1993 , p. 25. See also M. N. Shavv, International Law, Third Edition, Cambridge, Grotius Publications Limited, 1991 fact that, vvhile there is a lack of a universal defınition of human rights, violations can be recognised vvhen they occur because of popular imagination. There is a common belief that "the claim that there is no universal consensus on the defmition of human rights should not of itself deter us from alleviating suffering and injustice". 9 This moral attitude is the basis of a successfiıl implementation. Critics of international human rights code indeed often point to its origins in the various bili of rights and constitutions of the liberal democracies. The moral basis of human rights, as vve are ali human beings, exist in our common humanity. Their implementation, hovvever, varies through politics: Though the moral humanitarian obligation is the fundamental one, every state chooses independently hovv to respect these obligations. "VVhether everyone agrees that a particular phenomenon is a human right or not is one test of universality, but this is a sociological one. In fact, vvhether or not ali cultures agree is discernible. Hovvever, in the eyes of realists, morality and foreign policy coexist uneasily. If vve are to take human rights seriously as moral rights, then vve must accept that the relevant moral community is the human community. There stili remains a fundamental problem: Who can claim to have the moral authority to judge the failings of states about human rights in an international system based on the sovereign equality of states, vvith no higher authority to hand dovvn judgement.
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Another signifıcant point, regarding the relevance of human rights to the foreign policy, is the grovvth of international human rights lavv, vvhich suggests that human rights novv play a part in the decision about the legitimacy of a state, as vvell as other actors and institutions in international society. The recognition of a state or being a sovereign is not enough any more. The state should also, domestically, be the guarantor of basic human rights. Whilst the question of what these basic rights are may not yet be resolved in international lavv, this should not be understood that there are none.
11 Hovv the real vvorld of dıplomacy is penetrated by the human rights concern is the key question here. There are tvvo levels: Standard setting and Standard keeping. The latter is more problematic than the former. Rustovv expresses this problematic character of Standard keeping by arguing that, while diplomats sought the codifıcation of human rights for some decades, two majör controversies arose from the effort: First, the defınition of human rights; and second, the method of their global application.
12 As members of the international society, ali states engage in the process of Standard setting. For various reasons, hovvever, governments are quite ready to endorse these standards despite the absence of a will to comply with these standards. 13 The follovving section wıll look at the consequences of non-compliance vvith the human rights by the states
Foreign Policy Constraints on Human Rights
If it is accepted that human rights is now part of the calculation of vvhat is legitimate internationally, it might be expected that diplomats regard them in their policy making. The fırst function of diplomacy is communication among states;
14 That is, ali governments have to deal vvith almost every other government in the vvorld on many diverse questions. Then, it may be argued that if human rights is not dealt vvith, it becomes an obstacle to the fulfılment of such a function, especially if a state having an unsatisfactory human rights record is socially excluded from communication betvveen states. As not only keeping relations, but also maintaining good relations vvith other states becomes the prime objective of diplomacy, there exist an inducement to play dovvn the bad human rights records of certaın states, especially if there are some special reasons vvhy it is believed inadvisable to antagonise the other government concerned. In this regard, as Luard puts it, in some cases, other government may be considered important for strategic, commercial reasons; it may be an important supplier of raw materials as South Africa has been to ali Western countries.
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There is also the idea that free trade should have priorıty över human rights considerations. As the states have a mutual interest in trade, the mutuality of the interest vvould not be advanced by any opinion that an unsuccessful human rights performance ought to exclude other government from trade, or diminish its participation in it. According to the old fashioned liberal idea, trade also leads to peace as well as the transference of civilised values. This was the clear understanding for years among the Western countries in their "constructive engagement" vvith South Africa: "trade in the end vvill be good for human rights". Hovvever, in the meantime, it is generally accepted that the interruption of trade vvill highly unlikely bear any human rights fruit for the usual reasons that make sanctions prone to failure, vvhich is also true for aid. 16 Another connection of interest vvith human rights, apart from free trade, is security. This kind of national interest is most frequently played against human rights. Even vvhere human rights has been put as an objective of foreign policy, the attention to human rights can be cancelled by extraordinary circumstances. To illustrate, the US Foreign Assistance Act, Section 502B, gave an exception to the rule that governments that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of international human rights should be deprived of military aid. This is the intervention of the national interest. During the Carter admınistration, the US gave military aid to Indonesia, Philıppınes, South Korea and Zaire, despite their poor human rights records. These states benefıted either from their strategic position in the contest vvith the former USSR, or their natural resources, or both. This security argument applies to relations vvith adversaries as well as friends.
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Attempts to undertake an active human rights policy may also be argued to be contrary to the rules of diplomatic intercourse. Traditionally, each state has a fiili sovereignty över its own territory. The prohibition of interference in such matters is said to reduce the danger of conflict among states. 18 This rule precludes any criticism of the actions of other governments within their own countries.
To sum up, the human rights might be favoured by the foreign policy decision-makers in principle, and are preferred as standard setting.
19 Although practical cases of human rights violations have shrunk, the decision-makers normally prefer bilateral diplomacy and public debate tending tovvards issues of principle. On the other hand, private negotiation inclines tovvards compromise and understanding of the other persons' idea; they prefer quiet diplomacy vvhen considering a particular case. Even if human rights is taken up reluctantly, they are not received as a solution but a problem, and they are seen in the vvay of ordinary diplomacy 20 The issue of human rights is normally expected to surface in tvvo kinds of situations: When the interest of the state is plainly served, and vvhen the attention of human rights does not damage the other interests of the state. This raises the problem of inconsistency or double standards.
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Those vvho are interested in human rights should not underestimate the arguments made under this sub-section. Although ali of them may be challenged, they are not irrational altogether. The important point is that, vvhether or not they are true, they at least deter attempts by governments to pursue active human rights in their foreign policies. 
Degree of the importance of Foreign Policy Constraints
Vincent suggesfs that human rights might get in the vvay of communication among states, even though governments are obliged to deal vvith each other ali the time on a vvide variety of issues, and most of these relations vvould continue vvhatever posture one government may adopt on human rights issues 23 Therefore, NGOs role in promoting human rights as a foreign policy dimension becomes important. Many human rights publications of NGOs, facilitated by the advanced communication systems and questions asked about vvhat foreign ministers are going to do about them, have revvarded their efforts. This is one vvay in vvhich human rights has become a subject about vvhich states have to communicate vvith each other.
There is little evidence, hovvever, for the assumption that expressions of concern by one government on human rights vvill totally prejudice the conduct of normal business vvith the government criticised. It vvill depend partly on other factors governing the relationship betvveen the tvvo states, and even more on the manner in vvhich the issue is raised.
24 Thus, a relationship may be seriously damaged vvhen: a) Complaints are aired in a polemıcal and highly political style, or, pursued obsessively. They should be made in reasonable terms and in the proper forum; and b) The charges made are vague and generalised rather than specifıc, factual, and backed by fırm evidence. In other vvords, the charges made should not create the belief that they are inspired by malice or political prejudice.
Moreover, the danger that any expression of concern on such matters can be used by other governments as justıfication for breaking off or damaging relations has been reduced by the fact that human rights issues have already become one of the normal concerns of international politics. Not only Western countries, but also developing states, have become increasingly active över such issues and play a grovving role in the responsible international bodies . Also, the grovvth of regional organisations has emphasised this trend, from vvhich no government can be insulated at the international level.
The attempt to claim domestic sovereignty över such issues is now rightly rejected by most states. It is now almost universally recognısed that serious violations of human rights are a matter of concern to the international community. The diplomatic intercourse has also been changing quite dramatically for forty years in this regard; under the UN Charter, the discussion of human rights is possible in the Organisation and in other organs such as the Commission on Human Rights. 25 Regional Organisations such as the European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act (HFA) of the OSCE have also reinforced this change of diplomatic intercourse. The HFA ıncorporates the substance of ali the main instruments of human rights diplomacy. Moreover, international law has never been a static and inflexible body of rules; the defınition of what is "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of state, as well as sovereign rights of states is contınually evolving. It is therefore less and less likely that inter state relations vvill be fatally damaged" by taking up human rights issues in foreign policies.
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One may also be sceptical about the argument for free trade when it is deployed against attention to human rights. "The cobdenite connection betvveen trade, peace, and global solidarity is novv confronted by the idea that trade can easily buttress uncıvilised values as carry civilised ones". 27 Furthermore, in the vvorld in vvhich the multiplication of contacts among societies has been allovved by technology, trade no longer bears the principal burden of communication among them. Thus, there is less reason to regard the free trade as untouchable. 28 Even if the general argument that no attention to human rights in foreign policy should be paid in the interest of maintaining free trade vvas successful, this does not mean that trade should be manipulated at the drop of a political hat, but vve should be doubtfiıl about its universal claim to sovereignty. Aid, on the other hand, is easier to manipulate because it is more fırmly in the hands of governments. An example of this is that during the Carter Administration, there was an attempt in the US Congress to use the reduction of economic and military aid to discomfort repressive regimes. Despite the small impact of this, it however offered encouragement to domestic dissent.
Regarding the issue of security, it is no doubt hovvever that raison d'etat should prevail in great emergencies. Hovvever, the tendency of the argument of security against human rights is to stretch implausibly the idea of emergency. As every totaliter regime also requires its security to be defended, this devalues genuine security arguments. Even if there are genuine security arguments for attachment to a questionable regime, they should not be used merely to shore up the regime.
In the meantime, where the integration of human rights in foreign policy is domestically pushed, the rights of some individuals abroad might be taken up vvith more enthusiasms than others, vvhich is called as 'double-standards' or 'inconsistency'. In the past, the Reagan Administration was criticised in the US for fınding fault on human rights grounds, principally vvith communist 'enemies'. The main point about human rights is their equal application to friends and enemies. States should pay attention to consistency, but not in such a way as to allovv anything to be done. Here it must be stressed that the Aristotelian consistency (i.e. since the world is imperfect, then foreign policy is justifıed in treating unequal cases unequally) is itself not a persuasive argument against implanting human rights into foreign policy. 30 Regarding the issue of the inclusion of human rights ın foreign policy, it is true that the human rights are one more thing for dıplomats to be unenthusiastic about. The reason is practical as vvell as doctrinal. Human rights in foreign policy are not merely about standard setting, public pronouncements or quiet words vvith the minister about particular cases; they are also matters that affect the great purposes of the state in securing and nourishing its citizens. [VOL. XXX The argument that the inclusion of human rights by governments in their foreign policies is ineffective is also contrary to the facts. There have been many cases where intemational pressures, including public expressions of concem by other governments, have resulted in significant improvements in the human rights policies of particular states. On the other hand, it vvould be a misconception to hope that the government being criticised is suddenly going to reverse ali its policies and become ali at once a model of virtue. In the short term, liftle may happen. Hovvever, there might be a number of indirect effects: Firstly, the government criticised may be gradually brought to realise that the type of policy being pursued has a significant external cost. At least, its foreign offıce, vvhich is usually most avvare of foreign criticisms, may become an influence vvithin the government for a reform of policy. Secondly, nevv hope and encouragement may be given to human rights campaigners vvithin the country concerned. The intemational climate vvill be changed by expressions of concem on such matters. As the nevv forms of behaviour to be expected from civilised governments are established, and regional organisations become more active in the human rights area, the governments might become more responsive to such pressures. 
Main Aims of Foreign Policy vvith a Human Rights Objective (FPHRO)
The FPHRO is concerned, partly, vvith the general recognition of the importance of human rights ali över the vvorld, as vvell as the definition of the rights that ali governments should protect, and also vvith the preventıon or deterrence of particular violations of rights in individual countries. Luard suggests four main aims of FPHRO; 32 first, to ensure that human rights concems remain constantly at the top of the intemational agenda, secondly, to ensure that the minimum standards of human rights vvhich civilised states expect to see observed are satisfactorily defıned; thirdly, to improve the intemational machinery vvhich at present exists for promoting and protecting such rights; and fınally, to bring direct influence on governments ali över the vvorld so that the grave violations of human rights are less likely to Luard, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, p. 13. 32 Ibid" p. 15. occur. In other words, action must be taken by individual governments to cause improvements in the human rights situation elsevvhere.
The achievement of the first aim is the easiest one, because every government in the world declares, in general terms, its concern for this issue. In this regard, vvhat the US President Jimmy Carter did in this field vvas just to publicly demonstrate the importance that his government, as vvell as himself, attached to the question of human rights, and that it had become an integral part of the US foreign policy. According to Luard, 33 tvvo types of rights (civil and political, and economic and social) are complementary. One does not have preference över the other. He also gives examples to prove his point on the basis of countries arguing that the standards should be those that are generally applied in the international community as a vvhole, he goes on to say that the assertion of the entitlement of the "Universal" Declaration of Human Rights vvas that the standards vvould be attained in any country regardless of the size or poverty of a country.
Vincent, on the other hand, argues that an international programme for the achievement of human rights might be laid dovvn on the formulation of these basic rights.
34 His central thesis is that, as a project for international society, the acknovvledgement of a universal right to subsistence as priority över other human rights is necessary. These rights are interrelated to the three generations of human rights. They form part of the right to life, vvhich is the assertion of the fırst generation. They are also the central of social and economic rights, vvhich is the second generation of human rights. Finally, they are essential to the emergent solidarity right to development, vvhich is the third generation right. In his vievv, the place of basic rights in foreign policy is, hovvever, not located by the decision on priorities among rights. Although a series of choices is involved in this, it is not easy.
International bodies, in the last forty years, have made progress över the second aim raised by Luard. The UDHR fırst included the essential minimum standards of human rights, vvhich vvere amplifıed by the tvvo UN Covenants of 1966. There emerged also specialised and regional instruments such as International Convention Against Torture One of the continuing objectives of governments through such a policy is to clarify and amplify this code, particularly, by extending it in certain specialised areas. As the means regarding the second aim are well established, no revolutionary changes are needed. Concerning the human rights, any convention reflects the views of the international community, generally. Thus at present, it can only emerge from a process of international negotiation. Hovvever, there may be room for improving the procedures used for this purpose. Luard, on the other hand, argues that such international human rights bodies are not well equipped for this diffıcult and very important task. 35 According to him, it really requires a legal forum rather than a political one. Thus, he suggests the involvement of the International Lavv Commission (ILC) in the future process. Interestingly, ILC has not taken part in drafting conventions in the fıeld of human rights. Therefore it is stili vital that satisfactory texts should be achieved, vvhich can signifıcantly influence the behaviour of governments in these areas.
With regard to the third aim, it is generally belıeved that the UN bodies responsible should move on from legislation to the process specifıed as implementation. Hovvever, because of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs, it is really diffıcult to improve this machinery. Globally, the main body that relate to this issue is the UN Commission on Human Rights. Luard has the vievv that there has been a signifıcant improvement in this area, though there exists criticism över the UN Commission 36 On the other hand, the regional bodies can be more influential regarding to the third aim. For instance, already in America, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights probably plays a more effective part in judging and deterring human rights violations than any UN body. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights have been given much greater power than the UN Commission. ^Luard, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, p. 13 36 Ibid.
The fourth aim is the most diffıcult one as well as the most important to achieve, because it is also concerned vvith the security of the countries. To ensure their survival, the governments may feel that subversive forces in their countries should be prevented or suppressed. They also may feel that their repressive policies are the inevitable cost of maintaining povver or bringing a disturbed situation under control. In such situations, the governments may also ignore the opinions of other countries about respecting basic human rights. They may, hence, appear impervious to any appeals of other countries on that issue. Nonetheless, vvhatever the attitudes of such governments, it is a main aim of the FPHRO to bring effective influence on governments. To be able to pursue this aim, what means are available to an individual government to influence a situation of other countries concerned? According to Luard, although the list is not exhaustive, the follovving, in ascending order of urgency, are the main types of response in dealing vvith such questions: There are many states, vvhich rarely, if ever, undertake any of these steps. Even governments in the West, having FPHRO, do not often proceed beyond the first two or three steps. For effective action along the above mentioned lines, the follovving conditions must be fulfilled:
• The pursuance of such a policy must be consistent, regardless of political prejudice or diplomatic convenience. Sometimes, difficult and unvvelcome choices, both for governments and diplomats, vvill be involved in this. Diplomats abroad tend to become gradually committed to the existing regime, and are reluctant to take any steps, which may be unvvelcome to them.
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• Contacts should be made vvith a broad section of the population, including political opponents of the government. Hovvever, there is a corollary for this condition: The disadvantage in a total severing of relations. This, in practice, is the vvorst case scenario: not only the hope to influence the targeted regime is lost, but also an isolated regime often becomes more brutal than before. Nevvsom calls this situation "the high stakes", 38 vvhich is one of the problems and limitations of human rights diplomacy. He shovvs that the fear of a threat to its ovvn povver becomes easily a reason for brutality for targeted regimes. Thus it has been generally agreed that the promotion of contacts provides at least a chance to influence the climate of opinion vvithin other countries.
• Aid should be provided to the people directly, not to the government concerned. Luard also argues that, although small-scale assistance can be given, independently of the regime in povver, to groups in the country concerned running projects in the fıeld to help those most in need, it should go primarily to educational and agricultural projects or small scale co-operatives, vvhich vvill make the biggest contribution in creatıng employment and meeting basic needs, rather than to large scale dams, roads or steel milis, vvhich bring little direct benefıt to most of the population. 39 Where aid is providing direct benefıt to the people, there should be no cessation because of human rights violations, thereby penalising the people, in order to punish the sins of the rulers in the country concerned, except possibly in the most exceptional circumstances. Othervvise, it vvould be vvrong and illogical.
• Military assistance, on the other hand, has a different position on the effective action on the above mentioned lines. Where human rights violations occur in the country concerned, arms supplies and other kinds of military assistance should be halted, as one of the first steps taken to prevent such assistance being directly used or possibly being used by the government concerned in its oppression of its population, and that it can therefore reasonably be claimed by the recipient government as a mark of friendship and approval. Therefore, the regular reappraisal of programmes regarding military assistance and arms supplies is needed to ensure that the human rights policy of the state concerned is satisfactory.
• Among the above-mentioned steps, the most serious one is the breaking off of trade relations. Thus, it will only be considered in the most extreme cases. Concerning this action, if a country has a bad human rights record, investment in such a country could be prevented and discouraged at earlier stages. The same is true for the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Where there is always some value in maintaining contacts, almost the best thing is to retain diplomatic representation in some form.
• The argument that the most drastic step is alvvays the most influential is unacceptable because direct representations to the government concerned is sometimes the most influential one. The minister of the country concerned can be approached by the visiting ministers, even if they have arrived for other purposes, to make clear the concern caused in their own country by reports of serious human rights violations. Then, the influence of the minister approached vvithin the government may be used to cause changes in policies. If representations on such matters derive from more than one government they carry far greater vveight, as well as reducing the political costs of taking action and lessen the problem of locus standi, that is the right of governments to intervene in matters in vvhich their own nationals are not directly concerned.
• The importance of the NGOs is clear. One of the most useful ways in vvhich governments can influence the government concerned, at least indirectly, is to provide assistance to NGOs because they are indeed in some ways more effective on this subject than governments. Their concern on the subject can be spoken and published more freely. They are less likely to be accused of political bias. How they can be assisted is the important question. Usually fmancial support is unvvelcome because it might be thought that their independence has been prejudiced. Hovvever, regular exchanges of information and ideas and a pooling of knovvledge about the situation in particular states, joint seminars or other activities to educate the public and co-operation in international human rights bodies can be envisioned.
• The avaılability of information about the situation that exists in different countries ali över the world is necessary for both the public and the governments that will play a more effective role in preventing human rights violations elsevvhere. Although most people, at present, learn vaguely about what is happening in other countries, it cannot be saıd that impressions are generally very clear. One reason for this is that they are largely based on occasional nevvspaper reports rather than reliable and systematically compiled evidence. Also, in practice, the degree of concern depends upon the agenda of the press and television. On the other hand, the information supplıed by the governments should be objective. Governments usually only take action when their own public opinion is aroused. Thus, a better-informed public opinion vvould make a fiınction more in stimulating more effective action by governments. In this regard, the most useful action by NGOs is the publication of an artnual survey of the human rights situation in individual countries, vvith some indication of the gravity of the situation in each case.
Conclusion
Given that in today's vvorld, the issue of human rights are included in foreign policies of many states, and that foreign policy as the outside behaviour of a state is one of the elements of IR, the issue of legal human rights developments has become an important part for a foreign policy vvith a human rights objective. It also seems that its reflection in such a foreign policy is a key for the protection of human rights in IR. The reason is that the development of legal human rights makes the foreign policy vvith a human rights objective more effective. Not only those vvho are in foreign policy decision-making process, but also IR students are thus expected to take notice of such developments. The fırst step of this is of course the human rights education in IR departments of the universities.
The attached results of the Internet survey indicate that the IR students in Turkey need to have more opportunity to be able to follovv the international developments in the area of international lavv of human rights. Accordingly, the follovvings are offered: Ali departments of IR at the universities in Turkey should have an independent course 2002 THE TEACHNG OF ıR ıN TURKEY 143 of human rights; if possible, students who enrol at the departments of IR, should be able to take course from the faculties of law; ıf possible, students who are at the faculties of law, taking international law course, should also take various courses concerning IR theory.
